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This paper attempts to explain why the Brazilian inter-bank interest rate is so 
high  compared  with  rates  practiced  by  other  emerging  economies.  The 
interplay between the markets for bank reserves and government securities 
feeds into the inter-bank rate the risk premium of the Brazilian public debt. 
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  Lucas began his Nobel lecture making the following statement:  “The 
work  for  which  I  have  received  the  Nobel  Prize  was  part  of  an  effort  to 
understand  how  changes  in  the  conduct  of  monetary  policy  can  influence 
inflation, employment and production. So much thought has been devoted to 
this question and so  much evidence is available that one might reasonably 
assume that it had been solved long ago: It had not been solved in the 1970s 
when I began my work on it, and even now this question has not been given 
anything  like  a  fully  satisfactory  answer.”  [Lucas  (1996),  p.661].  My 
understanding of the meaning of a fully satisfactory answer is that money is 
still a headache from a theoretical point of view. Both workhorse frameworks 
of modern macroeconomics, the Arrow-Debreu and Samuelson overlapping-
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generation general equilibrium models, have no room for money as a medium 
of exchange.  This is at variance with the empirical evidence available, which 
cannot reject the hypothesis that money is essential for the functioning of a 
market economy. The only way out of this problem is to use some short cut, 
and  to  conduct  empirical  research  based  on  it.  Lucas’s  statement 
notwithstanding, there has been great progress in the last half-century about 
the effects and how monetary policy works. 
There is no doubt that money does matter, for good or for evil. In the 
short run money, in general, affects real output, but in the long run it affects 
only  the  price  level.  The  mechanisms  through  which  monetary  policy  are 
transmitted into changing nominal variables can be divided into two channels. 
The  direct  channel  affects  the  inflation  rate  through  the  expectation 
mechanism, as in the work reported by Sargent (1986) about the end of several 
hyperinflation  episodes.  The  experiences  of  Argentina  and  Brazil  ending 
hyperinflation overnight, with the Convertibility and Real Plans, can be added 
as  additional  evidence  supporting  the  direct  channel  of  monetary  policy 
transmission. The indirect channel encompasses a very rich menu, suitable for 
different tastes, and it is natural for economists writing on this subject to try to 
differentiate their products, as in a monopolist competitive firm. 
I will not address the issues involved in the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy, since there are excellent surveys [see the papers presented at 
the 1995 Journal of Economic Perspectives Symposia and at the 1995 Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Conference] available in the literature and I regard 
those issues a matter to be settled by hard econometric work. Since I have no 
empirical evidence on this subject to report, I will take this opportunity to 
address  a  problem  that  is  rather  peculiar  to  the  Brazilian  monetary  policy 
environment:  the  interplay  between  monetary  policy  and  public  debt 
management  policy.  This  interrelation  helps  one  to  understand  the  reasons 
why the basic rate of interest of the economy, the SELIC overnight rate of 
interest for Central Bank funds, is so high in real terms. 
   The goal of this paper is not to give a fully articulated answer of how to 
disentangle, in the short run, the Central Bank reserves interest rate from the 
treasury bill interest rate, because I do not have one, but just to raise some 
questions  that  could  help  in  providing  solutions  that  can  improve  the 
operational procedures of  the Brazilian Central  Bank. I think that the  new 
monetary policy regime introduced after a smooth and successful transition 
from the exchange rate crisis to the floating exchange rate system in 1999, will 
have to deal with some issues, such as reserve requirements, financial taxes, 
operational procedures of the inter-bank reserve market, inherited from the   3
past.  Otherwise,  lack  of  public  support  can  jeopardize  the  hard  work  of 
building an independent and strong central bank. 
  The  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  Section  2  defines  the  contagion 
effect and provides some background information on the development of the 
Brazilian  inter-bank  market  for  reserves;  Section  3  presents  a  very  simple 
model that tries to capture the subtleties involved when an asset indexed to the 
inter-bank market rate of interest is introduced in the economy and Section 4 
contains the concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. The Contagion Effect 
 
 
  The contagion effect of public debt on monetary policy will be defined 
as the risk premium (q ) built into the nominal rate of interest of central bank 
reserves, 
 
t t t t r q p r + + =  
where  r   is  the  risk-free  real  interest  rate  and  p   is  the  expected  rate  of 
inflation.  This  risk  premium  is  indeed  the  risk  of  Brazilian  government 
securities,  which  are  not  considered  by  the  market  to  be  risk-free.  To 
understand the reasons for the contagion effect, we have to go back to the very 
beginning of the current framework of monetary policy, and to highlight some 
facts that were very important in shaping its development. 
The  Brazilian  open  market  and  Central  Bank  reserves  market  were 
created in the early 1970s. At that time there was no secondary market for 
treasury bills, because this type of security was not issued by the Treasury. 
Because the indexed bonds (ORTN) issued by the Treasury were not suitable 
for open market operations, the Brazilian Central Bank, through its public debt 
management,  decided  to  create  a  bill  (LTN),  nominally  issued  by  the 
Treasury, but as a matter of fact managed by the Central Bank, to carry out 
open market operations. With this instrument, the Central Bank was entitled to 
create quasi-fiscal deficits, as can be verified by looking at its balance sheets 
over the years. 
Since  the  early  1980s,  with  the  introduction  of  a  new  system  of 
clearance and settlement of government securities (SELIC), the exchange of 
securities for Central Bank funds occurs on the same business day the trade is   4
agreed  upon.
1  Therefore,  government  securities  and  Central  Bank  reserves 
have become perfect substitutes as a store of value, and the banks would not 
hold excess reserves because they are dominated by government securities.
2 
The  high  leverage  ratio  of  Brazilian  financial  institutions  during  the 
1980s compelled the Central Bank Public Debt Director, the official name of 
the director in charge of monetary policy at that time, to create a Central Bank 
bill indexed to the overnight interest rate in 1986.
3 Since then, the Brazilian 
Central  Bank  has  issued  bills  and  notes,  some  of  them  indexed  to  the 
American dollar, to provide a hedge against exchange rate risk.  
The flexibility allowed by the Central Bank charter imposed no limits to 
the amount of international reserves the Central Bank could buy, due to the 
fact that it could always sterilize it by issuing bills and notes, at a price. If it 
were not for this institutional arrangement, it would have been impossible to 
sustain  for  so  long  the  former  regime,  adopted  during  the  first  term  of 
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, which collapsed in January of 1999.  
This whole set up, which allowed the Central Bank to issue not only 
money  but  bills,  notes  and  bonds,  was  very  important  to  avoid  the 
dollarization  of  the  Brazilian  economy  during  the  hyperinflation  period, 
because  it  allowed  the  banking  system  to  create  money  funds,  backed  by 
government  securities,  with  full  liquidity  in  Central  Bank  reserves.  These 
money funds worked as indexed money since their yield followed very closely 
the rate of inflation. Thus, in that environment government securities did not 
have to pay a risk premium, owing to the fact that they provided a full hedge 
against inflation.  
After the successful stabilization under the Real Plan and the adoption 
of the inflation target system, there is no need for a system that distorts the 
whole yield curve or term structure of interest rates, contaminating the private 
sector on account of public debt risk. The hard task is how to disentangle the 
Central Bank reserves market from the government securities market. The first 
best solution is to have a fiscal regime in which government securities become 
risk free. However, this solution is not at hand, because the primary fiscal 
surplus implemented since 1999, and followed through President Cardoso’s 
second term and President Lula tenure, is not based on institutions but on the 
personal  commitment  of  both  Presidents.  The  market  has  full  information 
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2 Barbosa(1991) presents an analysis of this operational procedure and its implications for the central bank 
reserves market. For a very interesting description of the American securities market see Fleming (1997). 
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about  this  fiscal  weakness  and  demands  a  risk  premium  on  government 
securities. 
The fragility of the Brazilian fiscal system has been decreasing, but it 
will  take  some  time  for  fiscal  discipline  to  become  embedded  in  our 
institutional  environment.  One  important  step  in  this  direction  was  the 
approval  of  the  Fiscal  Responsibility  Law  by  the  Congress  in  May  2000. 
According to this law, the Brazilian Central Bank is prohibited from issuing 
bills,  notes  or  bonds  since  2002,  and  is  free  to  be  concerned  with  its 
fundamental job, which is to issue money.  
The question that has to be raised, within the arrangements that have to 
be carried out to implement this new legal framework, is whether or not the 
time  has  come  for  the  Central  Bank  to  introduce  major  changes  in  its 
operational procedures, in such a way that the rate of interest on Central Bank 
reserves  would  be  free  of  government  securities  risk.  The  answer  to  this 
question is not very simple because it is very likely that there is a trade-off 
between the risk of government securities and that of Central Bank funds. The 
price that has to be paid to transform the Central Bank overnight rate into a 
risk-free rate is to increase the premium risk on government securities. Is the 
benefit to society resulting from eliminating this distortion worth the fiscal 
cost  involved?  As  I  stated  earlier  in  this  paper,  I  have  no  answer  to  this 
question, but I am convinced that it is worthwhile for the Brazilian Central 
Bank  to  carry  out  research  that  would  clarify  this  issue.  The  next  section 







  In this simple economy model there are two markets, one for SELIC 
indexed treasury bills and another one for bank reserves. The demand curve 
for  SELIC  indexed  treasury  bills  (LFT’s)  is  upward  sloping  because  an 
increase in  the  interest rate would  increase the demand  for such  bills (see 
Fig.1). After the securitization of Brazilian external debt in 1994, the Brazilian 
government issues securities denominated in domestic and foreign currencies. 
By arbitrage with government securities issued in foreign currencies, the law 
of one price states that the rate of return in SELIC indexed treasury bills is 
given by the rate of interest paid on government securities issued on foreign 
currencies, corrected by the expected exchange rate depreciation. Let us call   6
this  rate 
* r .  When  the  government  supplies  an  amount  of  SELIC  indexed 
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Fig.1 – Market for SELIC Indexed Treasury 
Bills 
Fig. 2 – Market for Bank Reserves 
 
  The demand curve for bank reserves is completely inelastic, as shown in 
Fig. 2, since reserves and government securities are perfect substitutes [see 
Barbosa(1991)]. The Central Bank is free to fix the level of interest rate in this 
market, the SELIC rate. Now, let us analyze what would happen if the Central 
Bank chooses an interest rate different from the interest rate (
* r ) that results 
from arbitrage between domestic and foreign government securities. 
  Let us assume that the Brazilian central bank fixes the SELIC rate at  B r , 
below the rate 
* r , as indicated in Figures 1 and 2. In such situation there will 
be an excess supply (AB) on the market for SELIC indexed treasury bills. In 
the case of conventional bills an excess supply would bring about a fall of 
their price. That is not the case with SELIC indexed treasury bills. An excess 
supply of SELIC bills would correspond to an equivalent excess of reserves 
(EF=AB) in the market for bank reserves and the market would be undersold. 
The Central Bank would have to buy the excess reserves otherwise the rate of 
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interest would decrease to zero, since it could not fall further due to the non-
negativity constraint. 
  Let us assume, now, that the Central Bank fixes the SELIC rate at  C r , 
above the rate 
* r , as shown in Figures 1 and 2. In this situation there will be 
an excess demand (AC) for SELIC indexed treasury bills. This excess demand 
in the market for SELIC bills would create a shortage of reserves in the market 
for bank reserves of the same amount (EG=AC) and the  market would be 
oversold. The Central Bank would have to clear the market for bank reserves, 
otherwise the rate of SELIC funds would skyrocket. 
  We may conclude that the only way for the Central Bank to act in a 
permanent basis in this environment is to fix the interest rate at 
* r . Otherwise 
both markets would not be in equilibrium.
5 This is the channel through which 






  With hindsight, based on our historical experience, we can state that it 
was  a  mistake  for  the  Brazilian  Central  Bank  to  introduce  open  market 
operations  in  the  beginning  of  the  1970s,  trying  to  copy  the  American 
institutions. The U.S. Treasury securities secondary market is very large and 
one of the most liquid markets in the world. Here, there was no treasury bill 
issued. The Brazilian market was created in a very artificial fashion without 
due considerations of the costs involved from such a course of action. 
   It  is  also  true  that  during  the  hyperinflation  years,  this  environment 
protected the Brazilian economy from the scourge of dollarization, because 
government  securities  were  used  to  back  indexed  money  issued  by  the 
financial system. This arrangement saved us from a currency board, which is a 
very primitive and straightjacket institution to deal with real shocks that affect 
the  economy,  as  became  crystal  clear  with  the  failure  of  the  Argentinean 
experiment with a currency board.
6 
  It is very usual for Brazilians to ask the question: why is the Brazilian 
inter-bank interest rate so high compared with the rates practiced by other 
emerging economies? The answer is a very simple one: we created in the past 
and we go on using a very peculiar asset, issued by the government, indexed 
                                                        
5  In  this  environment  the  Central  Bank  plays  an important role  supporting  the Treasury  to  issue  SELIC 
indexed bills sold at par value. 
6  It  should  be  pointed  out  that  a  currency  board requires fiscal  discipline. That  was not the  case  of  the 
Argentinean experiment.   8
to the inter-bank interest rate. This type of security feeds into the inter-bank 
rate the risk premium of the Brazilian public debt.
7 
  As  a  by-product  of  this  close  interrelationship  between  government 
securities and Central Bank funds, the basic rate of interest in the economy, 
the Central Bank funds rate, has a built-in risk premium. The contention of 
this  paper  is  that  it  is  worthwhile  to  change  this  state  of  affairs,  after  the 
success  of  the  Real  Plan  with  the  implementation  of  the  inflation  target 
system, because this is no longer a desirable policy. Removing the premium 
risk  of  Central  Bank  reserves  would  eliminate  a  very  special  type  of  a 
distortionary  tax  in  the  price  system,  which  affects  the  whole  economy, 







  Let us assume, to keep it as simple as possible, a perpetuity indexed to 
the interest rate. The price (P) of such a bond is the discounted stream of 
payoffs, 
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and  1 , = t t R . In order to show that the price of this bond is equal to one, we 
write the price in period t as a function of the price in period t+1: 
 













                                                        
7 There is a second issue related to the Brazilian interest rate that is spelled out by the following question: why 
the Brazilian natural real rate of interest is so high compared with the rates observed in other countries? This 
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Thus,  1 1 = = + t t P P  is a solution of this equation. 
  When  r r i = , the price of the indexed bond is given by, 
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  Duration  is a  volatility  measure defined  as the percentage change  in 
bond  price  for  a  change  in  interest  rate,  assuming  a  constant  yield.  The 
duration of the interest rate indexed bond is equal to zero because its price 








We may conclude that this type of bond does not have to include a premium to 
compensate for the risk of interest rate variation. 
  When there is credit risk the price of the indexed treasury bill is given 
by, 






where a  is the annual risk rate, M is the maturity of the treasury bill measured 
in days, and 252 is the number of working days in a year. We take natural log 
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and we use the approximation:  a a = + ) 1 ( log . 
  Table 1 reports the results of this regression for data from the period 
july/1994 to april/2005. The LFT price is the average price of the Treasury 
auction.  The  coefficient  a   is  positive  as  expected  and  significant  from  a 
statistical point of view. However a Chow test does reject that this coefficient 
is stable. When we exclude from the sample data the second half of 2002, due 
to the political shock of the Presidential election, the risk rate decreases from 
0.78%  to  0.73%,  as  shown  in  the  second  line  of  Table  1.  The  third  line 
contains  the  estimate  of  a   for  the  period  corresponding  to  the  President 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso government, excluding the last six months of his   10 
tenure. The fourth line shows the estimate of this parameter for the period of 
President Lula. Table 1 shows that this parameter has increased from 0.40% to 
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05/94                             06/02  0,0040 
(0,0003) 
07/02                             04/05  0,0091 
(0,0003) 
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